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CASE NOTES
ANTITRUST LAWS - Robinson-Patman Act - Appli-
cable to Territorial Price Discrimination Between Purchas-
ers. - Respondent, a nationwide brewer, reduced beer
prices in the St. Louis market while maintaining higher
prices elsewhere. The Federal Trade Commission issued a
cease and desist order charging respondent with violation
of section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 1&
(a) (1952), on the ground that the price reduction was dis-
criminatory and tended to lessen competition in the St. Louis
market. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on
review, set aside the order on the ground that the threshold
element of price discrimination as used in the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, was not established. On certiorari, HELD: Re-
versed. Charging customers of one region lower prices, while
maintaining higher prices elsewhere, is price discrimination.
as defined within the Robinson-Patman Act. FTC v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 80 Sup. Ct. 1267, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1385 (1960).
The applicability of section 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat
730 (1914), to cases where injury is to sellers' competition
is quite obvious. The primary line of commerce or the sellers'
competition was that which Congress sought to protect by-
passage of section 2 of the Clayton Act. Van Camp & Sons-
v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 73 L. Ed. 311 (1928).
The Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C.
§ 13 (1952), which amended section 2 of the Clayton Act,
was directed primarily at situations involving injury in the
secondary line of commerce, which is the buyers' competition.
FTC v. Automatic Canteen Co., 346 U. S. 61, 97 L. Ed. 1454
(1952). However, the Robinson-Patman Act only narrows,
the defenses under section 2 of the Clayton Act, ATT'Y. GEN.
NAT'L. COM'R. ANTITRUST REP. 156 (1955), and in so doing
would logically retain the prohibition to injury in the sellers'
line of commerce. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, supra, reads in perti-
nent part as follows: "It shall be unlawful... to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality.., where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
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monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination... "
The term "to discriminate in price" referred to in the Robin-
son-Patman Act has been defined as charging two purchasers
different prices. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 99
L. Ed. 1196 (1947). The price differential may be justified
by certain defenses contained in the Robinson-Patman Act.
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), (b) (1952);
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 95 L. Ed. 239 (1951).
The purchasers discriminated among may or may not be in
competition with one another. If they are in competition with
each other, then the discrimination would clearly be within
the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1944).
If, however, as in the principal case the buyers are not in
competition with one another, at least one court has held that
this is not discrimination within the meaning of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231
F. 2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955.) cert. denied, 350 U. S. 991 (1955).
The Court felt there must be some relationship between the
two purchasers. Rep. Utterback, who was in charge of the bill
in the House of Representatives, made the statement that he
felt that there must be some relationship between the purchas-
ers. 80 CONG. REC. 9416 (1936). Competition would clearly be
such a relationship. The history of the Robinson-Patman Act
is contradictory to the view held in the Balian case and Rep.
Utterback's statement, since territorial price cutting was the
principal evil sought to be corrected by Congress with pas-
sage of section 2 of the Clayton Act. H. R. REPT. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914). The predatory practices
sought to be eliminated involved no competition between
purchasers. Since, as previously mentioned, the Robinson-
Patman Act in effect extended the power of the Clayton
Act, the vitality of the prohibition of territorial price cutting
logically would be in effect today. The courts seem to have
followed this view. In two decisions by the court of appeals
it was specifically held that the purchasers discriminated
among need not be in competition with each other. Atlas
Bld'g Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F. 2d
950 (10th Cir. 1959) cert. denied, 80 Sup. Ct. 1608 (1960);
Muller v. FTC, 142 F. 2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). In the recent
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case of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread, 348 U. S. 115, 99 L. Ed.
145 (1954), the question of territorial price discrimination
was partly involved and no competition between purchasers
was evident. The Supreme Court in regards to this price
cutting said, "it is... clear that ... the Clayton Act and
the Robinson-Patman Act barred the use of interstate busi-
ness to destroy local business, outlawing the price cutting
employed by the respondent."
The Court is unquestionably correct in holding the Robin-
son-Patman Act applicable to cases where the injury is to
sellers' competition. The Van Camp case, a previous decision
restricting section 2 of the Clayton Act to cases where the
injury was to sellers' competition, was overruled. The Court
there held that other lines of commerce as well as that of
sellers were protected by section 2 of the Clayton Act. Under
the Robinson-Patman Act the correctness of this view would
not seem to be in doubt. In the Moore case, no doubt as to
the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act was cast. That
case involved injury to sellers' competition. As previously
mentioned, the intent of Congress in passing section 2 of
the Clayton Act was to eliminate territorial price cutting of
large companies. If here the Court had held that the re-
spondent was not guilty of price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act due to a lack of competition between
buyers, it would plainly have been at odds with what Congress
intended under section 2 of the Clayton Act and the decision
in the Moore case. A contrary ruling to the present one
would be in effect a mandate to discriminators to escape
liability by showing themselves guilty of the evil Congress
sought to correct with section 2 of the Clayton Act.
JAMES H. FowLEs, III.
EVIDENCE - Ownership of Automobile - Certificate
of Title Only Evidence of Ownership. - Plaintiff, alleged
daughter and only heir of deceased, sought to obtain posses-
sion of an automobile of deceased by virtue of a certificate
of title which showed her to be the owner. Defendant, who
was living with deceased at the time of his death, originally
had possession of the automobile and the certificate, but
plaintiff acquired the certificate by claiming that she wanted
1961]
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to help defendant settle her affairs. Trial court directed a
verdict in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that the cer-
tificate of title made out a prima facie case which defendant
did not rebut. On appeal, HELD: Reversed. A certificate of
title is not title in itself but only evidence of title. However,
the daughter's claim, based on the contention that she was
the daughter and only heir of the deceased, but with no posi-
tive testimony to prove this fact, was sufficient to raise a
jury question as to whether plaintiff held the vehicle by gift
or whether defendant was the actual owner. Robinson v.
Martin, -Ark.-, 328 S. W. 2d 260 (1959).
Today many states require registration of title of motor
vehicles. Staunton Industrial Loan Corp. v. Wilson, 190 F. 2d
706 (4th Cir. 1951). The statutes usually provide for the is-
suance of a certificate of title manifesting ownership and its
recordation with the state agency in charge of motor vehicle
registration. Codding v. Jackson, 132 Colo. 320, 287 P. 2d 976
(1955). This is a departure from the common law which did
not require a transfer of a certificate showing ownership of a
chattel to perfect a purchaser's title. See BROWN, PERSONAL
PROPERTY, § 66 (2d ed. 1955). The generally recognized pur-
pose of such modification is to provide a means of identifying
motor vehicles, to ascertain owners thereof, to prevent theft
of vehicles, and to prevent fraud. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Drawbaugh, 159 Neb. 149, 65 N. W. 2d 542 (1954).
The application of the statutes vary. In some jurisdictions
the certificate of title constitutes sole and conclusive evidence
of ownership. Eureka Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Maxwell, 276 F. 2d 132 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Turpin v. Standard
Reliance Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99 N. W. 2d 26 (1959). A
possible exception to this rule may apply when fraud is
involved. Zoloto v. Scott, 160 N. E. 2d 318 (Ohio 1959);
Automobile Fin. Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N. E.
2d 1002 (1940). Other jurisdictions hold that the certificate
creates a presumption of ownership but that the presump-
tion may be overcome by evidence of actual ownership.
United States Cas. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. 2d 451
(5th Cir. 1953); Federico v. Universal C. 1. T. Credit Corp.,
140 Colo. 145, 343 P. 2d 830 (1959). Finally, there are
courts which regard the certificate as mere evidence of title,
Champa v. Consolidated Fin. Corp., 231 Ind. 580, 110 N. E.
2d 289 (1953) ; Rody v. Winn, 162 Cal. App. 2d 35, 327 P. 2d
[Vol. is
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579 (1958); or as no muniment of title. Adkisson v. Wait-
man, 202 Okla. 309, 213 P. 2d 579 (1950); Liebendofer v.
Wilson, 175 Pa. Super. 632, 107 A. 2d 133 (1954).
In the instant case the court, by viewing the certificate
as evidence to be weighed by the jury along with other
factors in the case, is following the view taken by many
courts in recent decisions. The courts at first zealously con-
strued the statute by recognizing no right or interest in a
motor vehicle unless a certificate of title was produced by
the person claiming ownership. They soon found that legis-
lative intent was being defeated by such construction. Now
most courts give a liberal construction to the statutes. It
appears that the South Carolina Legislature has accepted
the most pragmatic of the theories concerning the eviden-
tiary status of the certificate by stating that the certificate
is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. CODE OF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 46-139.45 (1952). Unless the
certificate is questioned, its holder will be presumed to be
the owner with any encumbrances that it shows; however,
evidence of actual ownership may rebut this presumption.
By this interpretation it seems that the purpose of the stat-
ute will be most readily accomplished.
MIRIAM BRITT.
LABOR LAW - Taft-Hartley Act - Remedy for a Run-
away Shop. - By transferring its plant to Hanover, Penn-
sylvania, from Philadelphia, defendant company was found
to have breached its existing collective bargaining contract,
which prohibited plant removal for any reason, and to have
engaged in an unfair labor practice. [See separate decision
United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,
183 F. Supp. 568 (D. C. Pa. 1960)]. The plaintiff union
which has represented the workers for twenty years suffered
a financial loss as a result of the lay-off of members in
Philadelphia. Its reputation as a bargaining agent was also
damaged. The court felt to require that operations be re-
turned to the original site would be unwarranted from an
economic standpoint, and to order the company to offer jobs
and transportation expenses to the employees would be im-
practical. The sole question before the court was that of
1961]
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the proper remedy. The defendant contended that the union
should be entitled only to past dues lost while the contract
was in force. HELD: The union is entitled to recover actual
damages for dues lost to date and for a twenty-year period in
the future, and the court is not prohibited from granting the
union punitive damages under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U. S. C. § 185
(1952). United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe
2Wfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (D. C. Pa. 1960).
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
49 Stat. 452 (1935-36), as amended by 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
as amended by 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a)
(1952), permits federal district courts to entertain suits for
breach of collective bargaining contracts. Section 8 (a) (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act proscribes certain em-
ployer activities as unfair labor practices, 29 U. S. C. § 158
(a) (1) (1952). Jurisdiction of a federal district court, how-
ever, is not precluded where an unfair labor practice may
also constitute a breach of a collective agreement. Textile
Workers Union of America v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F. 2d 529
(4th Cir. 1951). A breach of a collective bargaining contract
is not an unfair labor practice within the contemplation of
the Act. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 348 U. S. 437, 99 L. Ed. 510 (1954),
rehearing denied, 349 U. S. 925, 99 L. Ed. 1256 (1955). An
act may be a breach of the contract as well as an unfair labor
practice, but the former is enforced by the courts while the
latter is enforced by the National Labor Relations Board.
Lodge 12, District 37, International Ass'n. of Machinists v.
Cameron Iron Works, 257 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 358 U. S. 880, 3 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1958). Actual damages
have been obtained by a union under section 301 (a) for an
employer's breach of a collective agreement, Burlesque Artist
Ass'n. v. Hirst Enterprises, 267 F. 2d 414 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Sil-
verton v. Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434 (D. C. Cal. 1954), and puni-
tive damages have been awarded an employer under section
303 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 187 (1952), United Mine Workers
v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F. 2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 359 U. S. 1013, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (1959). By way of
comparison, the NLRB has provided alternative remedies
where an unlawful plant removal is involved. Because it is lim-
ited by the principle of reasonableness and is prohibited from
[V/ol. 13
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exercising punitive powers, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U. S. 7, 85 L. Ed. 6 (1940), the Board either requires the "run-
away shop" to be returned to its former location or orders re-
instatement of employees with expenses for moving and trans-
portation. Rome Products Co., 77 NLRB 1217 (1948) ; Klotz,
13 NLRB 746 (1939). Conversely, a state court, in an action
where a plant transfer violated a collective agreement, con-
ceded that the union was entitled to compensatory damages.
Farulla v. Freundlich, 279 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1935). There is
a contrary view, however, which contends that the Act makes
no provision for the recovery of punitive damages. Patton v.
United Mine Workers, 114 F. Supp. 596 (D. C. Va. 1953),
rev'd 211 F. 2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 324,
99 L. Ed. 649 (1954). The United States Supreme Court has
declared, nevertheless, that the lower federal courts "must
fashion substantive law to apply in section 301 (a) from the
policy of national labor laws" with the scope of "judicial in-
ventiveness" determined by the problem involved. Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957).
Following the declared policy of the Supreme Court, the
lower federal district court in the principal case fashioned
a rule which indicates that actual and punitive damages will
be awarded where a breach of a collective contract is "some-
thing more than a dispute between employer and union"
but is, at the same time, an unfair labor practice. By pro-
jeeting the status quo of the parties, as it existed at the time
of the breach, into the future, although based on probability,
allows speculation to enter the decision. Is it conjecture to
say that because of a twenty-year bargaining history it is
probable that an employer and a union will bargain twenty
more years? This court thinks not, but it does admit that
a forty or fifty year period would be. Why draw a line at
twenty years to distinguish between probability and possi-
bility? Under the court's decision, the plaintiff not only re-
ceives compensation for the breach of an ekisting contract,
but also obtains damages for breach of a contract which has
mere potential existence. How can one undo that which
never has been done? The award of punitive damages, grant-
ed because defendant's conduct amounted to an unfair labor
practice as well as a contract breach, cannot be sustained
in the light of the decisions above. To quote from Mr. Justice
7
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Frankfurter's dissent in the Lincoln Mills case, "there are
severe limits on 'judicial inventiveness' even for the most
imaginative judges." The court could have better justified
granting the plaintiff the same amount of damages by com-
pensating for the injury which its reputation endured as the
result of the breach. The court did indicate this factor but
did not develop it to any large extent. To have awarded
damages by this method would have been not only more
reasonable but more practical, and certainly less objection-
able.
CLARENCE T. GOOLSBY, JR.
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